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Abstract—This paper reports a new speed record for FPGAs
in cracking Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems. We conduct a detailed
analysis of different F2𝑚 multiplication approaches in this
application. A novel architecture using optimized normal basis
multipliers is proposed to solve the Certicom challenge ECC2K-
130. We compare the FPGA performance against CPUs, GPUs,
and the Sony PlayStation 3. Our implementations show low-
cost FPGAs outperform even multicore desktop processors and
graphics cards by a factor of 2.
Index Terms—Elliptic Curve Cryptography; Certicom Chal-
lenge; FPGA;
I. MOTIVATION: ATTACKING ECC2K-130
Elliptic-Curve Cryptosystems (ECC), independently in-
vented by Miller [18] and Koblitz [15], are now commonplace
in both the academic literature and practical deployments.
ECC allow shorter key-lengths, ciphertexts, and signatures
than other conventional cryptosystems, e.g., RSA, and thus
admit valuable optimizations in computing and communication
complexity.
The security of ECC relies on the difficulty of Elliptic
Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [3]. Briefly
speaking, ECDLP is to find an integer 𝑛 for two points
𝑃 and 𝑄 on an elliptic curve 𝐸 such that 𝑄 ≡ [𝑛]𝑃 .
To use ECC in the real world, practitioners need to know:
how big should the parameters (or, colloquially, the “key
size”) be to avoid practical attacks? Choosing parameters too
small allows computational attackers to solve the ECDLP
instance, while choosing parameters too large wastes time,
communication, and storage. To encourage investigation of
these issues, researchers at Certicom Corp. published a list
of ECDLP challenges in 1997 [7].
Smaller members of the list of Certicom ECDLP challenge
problems have been solved. Escott et al. report on their
successful attack on ECCp-97, an ECDLP in a group of
roughly 297 elements [8]. A larger instance, ECC2-109 was
solved by Monico et al. [6]. Bos et al. analyze and solve the
ECDLP in a group of roughly 2112 elements using PS3s [4].
This paper reports on our effort to solve one of the Certicom
ECDLP challenge problems using FPGAs. We focus on a
Koblitz curve challenge over F2131 , called “ECC2K-130.”
Compared to previous attacks, which are mostly implemented
in software on general-purpose workstations, our work ob-
tains a much higher performance-cost ratio by using FPGA
platforms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sum-
marizes related work. In Section III we give a short description
of the function that we implement on FPGA. Section IV and
V explore different algorithms and architectures. Section VI
reports on the results, concluding in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The strongest known attacks against the ECDLP are generic
attacks based on Pollard’s rho method [20], [5]. Further
improvements including parallelization and the use of group
automorphisms were made by Wiener and Zuccherato [26],
van Oorschot et al. [25], and Gallant et al. [9]. The parallelized
Pollard rho method consists of parallel loops that search for
distinguished points. Each loop starts from a random point
on 𝐸 and ends when a distinguished point is hit. The core
function is thus the iteration function. Our work implements
this function along with its improvements.
FPGAs have been applied to the Pollard rho method in
several previous works. Gu¨neysu et al. analyze ECDLPs
over fields of odd-prime characteristic [11], [10], targeting a
machine with 128 low-cost FPGAs. They extrapolate that to
break an ECDLP in a group of roughly 2131 elements using
this machine as taking over a thousand years.
Similarly, Meurice de Dormale et al. apply FPGAs to the
ECDLP [17]. Here, they use characteristic-two finite fields,
but restrict their inquiry to polynomial basis. Although con-
ventional wisdom has held that low-weight polynomial basis is
a better choice, in our application we can take advantage of the
free repeated squarings (2𝑛-th powers) offered in normal basis.
In addition, recent progress on normal-basis multiplication by
Shokrollahi et al. [24] and Bernstein and Lange [2] further
improve the prospects for normal basis. Our work is the first
Fig. 1: Dataflow of the iteration function: 𝑃𝑖+1 = 𝜎𝑗(𝑃𝑖)⊕𝑃𝑖.
(Note here 𝜎𝑗(𝑥) = 𝑥2𝑗 )
FPGA implementation of the parallelized Pollard rho method
using normal basis multiplication.
This work is part of a global distributed effort to break the
largest ECDLP ever solved [1]. While that paper summarizes
the overall effort, here we focus on the FPGA implementation.
The Contribution of This Paper. As part of this effort,
this paper explores FPGA implementation options for the core
finite-field arithmetic operations as well as architectures. An
in-depth comparison between multipliers (polynomial basis,
Type-II normal basis, and Shokrollahi’s) is given. Most no-
tably, this is the first FPGA implementation of Shokrollahi’s
multiplication algorithm. Our work proves the superiority of
an FPGA platform over other specialized architectures and its
suitability for the tasks that are computationally demanding.
Results in this paper are relevant both to the cryptanalytic
community as well as those interested in fast cryptographic
implementations in normal basis.
III. ITERATION FUNCTION
We briefly describe the iteration function which we imple-
mented in the FPGAs in this section. The general attack strat-
egy and the design rationale behind of the iteration function
can be found in [1].
Our condition for a point 𝑃𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦) to be a distinguished
point is that HW(𝑥) ≤ 34, where 𝑥 is represented using type-
II normal-basis and HW(𝑥) returns the Hamming weight of 𝑥.
Our iteration function is defined as
𝑃𝑖+1 = 𝜎
𝑗(𝑃𝑖)⊕ 𝑃𝑖, (1)
where 𝜎𝑗(𝑃𝑖) = (𝑥2
𝑗
, 𝑦2
𝑗
) and 𝑗 = ((HW(𝑥𝑃𝑖)/2) mod 8)+
3. To solve ECC2K-130, about 260.9 iterations are expected
in total [1].
An efficient implementation of the iteration function is thus
the key step towards a fast attack. Given 𝑃𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦), the iteration
function computes 𝑃𝑖+1(𝑥′, 𝑦′) using Eq.(1). Fig. 1 shows the
data flow of the iteration function.
IV. OPTIMIZING FINITE-FIELD OPERATIONS
The iteration function consists of two multiplications, one
inversion and several squarings in F2𝑚 . Thus, fast finite-field
arithmetic is essential to optimize the attack.
A vast body of literature exists on finite field arithmetic, and
we are free to choose from a variety of representations and
algorithms. For example, we can use either polynomial basis
or normal basis for element representation, and an iteration can
be performed using either the Extended Euclidean Algorithm
(EEA) or Fermat’s little theorem. This leads to an important
question: which configuration (basis, multiplication algoirthm,
inversion algorithm) ensures the most efficient implementation
of the aforementioned iteration function? We try to answer
this question with complexity analysis and design-space ex-
ploration.
A. Multiplication
An element of F2131 can be represented in both polynomial
basis P and Type-II normal basis N, where
P = { 1, 𝑤, 𝑤2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝑤130},
N = { 𝛾 + 𝛾−1, 𝛾2 + 𝛾−2, 𝛾22 + 𝛾−22 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝛾2130 + 𝛾−2130}.
Here 𝑤 is a root of an irreducible polynomial of degree 131,
while 𝛾 is a primitive 263𝑟𝑑 root of unity. Multiplication in
polynomial basis has long been considered more efficient than
normal basis. On the other hand, squaring in normal basis is
simply a circular shift. Moreover, computing any power 𝛼2𝑛
can be performed by circularly-shifting by 𝑛 positions. We
implemented both options for comparison.
Besides conventional multiplication algorithms in poly-
nomial and normal basis, we also implemented a recently
reported hybrid algorithm, due to Shokrollahi [24]. When
multiplication is needed, two field elements are converted to
polynomial basis, a polynomial-basis multiplication is carried
out, then the results are converted back to normal basis and
reduced. This paper includes the first FPGA implementation
of this method.
1) Polynomial-Basis Multiplier: Algorithms for multipli-
cation in polynomial basis consist of two steps, polynomial
multiplication and modular reduction. They can be carried
out separately or interleaved. Given two elements 𝐴(𝑤) =∑𝑚−1
𝑖=0 𝑎𝑖𝑤
𝑖 and 𝐵(𝑤) =
∑𝑚−1
𝑖=0 𝑏𝑖𝑤
𝑖
, a bit-serial modular
multiplication algorithm is shown in Alg. 1.
It is well known that one way to reduce area complexity is
to use a special-form polynomial 𝑃 (𝑤). For F2131 there exists
a low-weight irreducible pentanomial 𝑃 (𝑤) = 𝑤131 + 𝑤13 +
𝑤2+𝑤+1. Thus, the complexity of step 3 in Alg. 1 is (𝑚+4)
XOR and (𝑚+ 4) AND operations.
One can also compute 𝐶(𝑤) = 𝐴(𝑤)𝐵(𝑤) =
∑2𝑚−2
𝑖=0 𝑐𝑖𝑤
𝑖
first, and then reduce it with 𝑃 (𝑤). In this case, the Karat-
suba method [14] can be used to reduce the complexity of
Algorithm 1 Bit-serial modular multiplication in F2𝑚
Input: 𝐴(𝑤) =
∑𝑚−1
𝑖=0 𝑎𝑖𝑤
𝑖
, 𝐵(𝑤) =
∑𝑚−1
𝑖=0 𝑏𝑖𝑤
𝑖 and 𝑃 (𝑤).
Output: 𝐴(𝑤)𝐵(𝑤) mod 𝑃 (𝑤).
1: 𝐶(𝑤)(=
∑𝑚
𝑖=0 𝑐𝑖𝑤
𝑖)← 0;
2: for 𝑖 = 𝑚− 1 to 0 do
3: 𝐶(𝑤)← 𝑤(𝐶(𝑤) + 𝑐𝑚𝑃 (𝑤) + 𝑏𝑖𝐴(𝑤));
4: end for
Return: 𝐶(𝑤)/𝑤.
polynomial multiplication. The reduction phase requires O(𝑚)
AND and XOR operations when low-weight 𝑃 (𝑤) exists.
For example, when 𝑃 (𝑤) is a pentanomial, reducing 𝐶(𝑤)
requires around 4𝑚 AND and 4𝑚 XOR operations. The over-
all complexity of a modular multiplication is M(𝑚)+O(𝑚),
where M(𝑚) is the complexity of an 𝑚-bit polynomial mul-
tiplication.
2) Normal-Basis Multiplier: The normal-basis multiplier
by Sunar and Koc¸ [23] employs the fact that an element
(𝛾2𝑖 + 𝛾2−𝑖 ) for 𝑖 ∈ [1,𝑚] can be written as (𝛾𝑗 + 𝛾−𝑗)
for some 𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚]. As a result, the following basis pN is
equivalent to N:
pN = {𝛾 + 𝛾−1, 𝛾2 + 𝛾−2, 𝛾3 + 𝛾−3, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , 𝛾131 + 𝛾−131}.
pN is also known as permuted normal basis. Let 𝛽𝑖 =
(𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾−𝑖), then an element 𝑇 in F2𝑚 is represented as
𝑇 =
∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑡𝑖𝛽𝑖. One multiplication of 𝐴 and 𝐵 represented
with pN requires 𝑚2 AND and 3𝑚(𝑚−1)/2 two-input XORs.
This algorithm is then adapted by Kwon [16] to deduce
a systolic multiplier. Compared to the Sunar-Koc¸ multiplier,
Kwon’s architecture (Fig. 3 in [16]) is highly regular and thus
can be implemented in a digit-serial manner. On the other
hand, it has higher complexity: 2𝑚 AND and 2𝑚 XOR gates
for a bit-serial multiplier.
3) Shokrollahi’s multiplier: Shokrollahi discovered an effi-
cient algorithm for basis conversion between permuted normal
basis and polynomial basis. Later, Bernstein and Lange pro-
posed further optimizations to this approach including a more
straight-forward conversion function. More details on this
multiplication method can be found in their recent work [2].
The new polynomial basis (nP) is defined in [2] as Type-II
polynomial basis.
nP = {(𝛾 + 𝛾−1), (𝛾 + 𝛾−1)2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , (𝛾 + 𝛾−1)𝑚}
which leads to a hybrid normal-basis multiplication algorithm.
We denote 𝐴𝑛𝑃 and 𝐴𝑝𝑁 the representation of 𝐴 using nP and
pN, respectively. A multiplication then proceeds as follows.
1) converting to polynomial basis: 𝐴𝑛𝑃 ← 𝐴𝑝𝑁 , 𝐵𝑛𝑃 ←
𝐵𝑝𝑁 ,
2) polynomial multiplication: 𝐶𝑛𝑃 ← 𝐴𝑛𝑃𝐵𝑛𝑃 ,
3) converting back to normal basis (2𝑚-bit conversion):
𝐶𝑝𝑁 ← 𝐶𝑛𝑃 ,
4) reduction (folding).
Let 𝑆𝑝𝑁2𝑛𝑃 be a transformation function that converts
𝐴𝑝𝑁 to 𝐴𝑛𝑃 . The essential observation by Shokrollahi is
Fig. 2: Shokrollahi multiplier
that basis conversion can be recursively broken down to half-
length transformations. Let 𝑓𝑝𝑁 and 𝑓𝑛𝑃 be corresponding
representations of 𝑓 in pN and nP, respectively,
𝑓𝑝𝑁 = [𝑓1 𝑓2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑓8]⊙ [(𝛾 + 𝛾−1) (𝛾2 + 𝛾−2) ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ (𝛾8 + 𝛾−8)]𝑇 ,
𝑓𝑛𝑃 = [𝑔1 𝑔2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 𝑔8]⊙ [(𝛾 + 𝛾−1) (𝛾 + 𝛾−1)2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ (𝛾 + 𝛾−1)8]𝑇 ,
Converting 𝑓𝑝𝑁 to 𝑓𝑛𝑃 can be then performed with two 4-bit
transformations:
{𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝑔4}nP 𝑆𝑝𝑁2𝑛𝑃←−−−−− {𝑓1 + 𝑓7, 𝑓2 + 𝑓6, 𝑓3 + 𝑓5, 𝑓4}pN
{𝑔5, 𝑔2, 𝑔7, 𝑔8}nP 𝑆𝑝𝑁2𝑛𝑃←−−−−− {𝑓5, 𝑓6, 𝑓7, 𝑓8}pN
The pN → nP and nP → pN conversion in F2𝑚 takes
(𝑚/2) log2(𝑚/4) operations each. In total, one field mul-
tiplication takes about M(𝑚) + 𝑚 log2𝑚 + 𝑚 log2(𝑚/4)
operations. A more detailed discussion on the complexity can
be found in [2].
Based on the analysis above, we can draw the following
conclusions:
∙ A bit-serial multiplier using polynomial basis has a lower
area complexity than one using normal basis.
∙ When low-weight polynomials exist, Shokrollahi’s multi-
plication algorithm is likely to have a higher complexity
than convential polynomial basis multiplication since the
base conversion step is more complex than the polyno-
mial reduction.
Though it seems that polynomial basis should be used, nor-
mal basis offers several advantages in this specific application.
First, the Pollard rho iteration function requires the Hamming
weight of 𝑥-coordinate represented in normal basis. In fact,
thanks to the Frobenius endomorphism, checking HW of 𝑥 in
normal basis checks 131 points simultaneously. This brings
a speedup of
√
131 to the attack [1]. Second, the iteration
function includes two 𝜎𝑗(𝑥) = 𝑥2𝑗 routines (known as 𝑚-
squaring). In normal basis, 𝜎 is essentially a circular shift of
𝑗 bits, and thus can be performed in one cycle. Gains in 𝑚-
squaring compensate the loss in multiplications.
B. Inversion
Inversion is the most costly of the four basic field opera-
tions. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) and Fermat’s
Algorithm 2 Simultaneous inversion (Batch size = 3)
Input: 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3.
Output: 𝛼−11 , 𝛼−12 and 𝛼−13 .
1: 𝑑1 ← 𝛼1
2: 𝑑2 ← 𝑑1𝛼2
3: 𝑑3 ← 𝑑2𝛼3
4: 𝑢← 𝑑−13
5: 𝑡3 ← 𝑢𝑑2, 𝑢← 𝑢𝛼3
6: 𝑡2 ← 𝑢𝑑1, 𝑢← 𝑢𝛼2
7: 𝑡1 ← 𝑢
Return: 𝑡1, 𝑡2, 𝑡3.
Little Theorem (FLT) are widely used to perform inversion.
In polynomial basis, the binary variant of EEA is generally
faster than FLT, but it requires dedicated hardware. On the
other hand, FLT can be performed on standard multiplier, thus
has almost no area overhead. In normal basis, the variant of
FLT attributed to Itoh and Tsujii [13] is a better choice since
squaring is free.
To further reduce the computation costs for inverses, we
employ Montgomery’s trick that batches multiple inversions
by trading inversions for multiplications [19]. Alg.2 shows
this method to invert three inputs. Indeed, we can trade one
inversion for three extra multiplications. As a result, one
iteration function uses 5M + (1/𝑛)I where 𝑛 is the batch size.
Using this trick, a high performance inverter is no longer
needed. Indeed, the delay caused by the inverter is 1/𝑛 cycles.
It is negligible given a large 𝑛. Therefore, we choose FLT
instead of EEA.
V. ARCHITECTURE EXPLORATION
The architecture of the engine has a fundamental impact
on the overall throughput. Among all the design options the
following two are of great importance.
1) Multiplier architecture
2) Memory architecture
As an architecture exploration, we implemented three different
architectures using different types of multipliers.
A. Architecture I: Polynomial Multiplier
As a starting point, we take a programmable elliptic-
curve coprocessor as the platform. A digit-serial polynomial
multiplier (see [21] for details) is used. A dedicated squarer
is included. In each loop, the 𝑥-coordinate is converted into
its normal basis representation, and its Hamming weight is
counted. This adds a base-conversion block and a Hamming-
weight computation block.
On this platform, squaring or addition takes two clock
cycles, while multiplication takes ⌊𝑛/𝑑⌋ + 1 cycles given a
digit-size 𝑑. The design is synthesized using ISE 11.2 and
the target FPGA is Xilinx Spartan-3 XC3S5000 (4FG676).
Implementation results show that 𝑑 = 22 gives the best trade-
off in terms of area-delay product.
Fig. 3: Archi-I: ECC processor using polynomial basis
The design consumes 3,656 slices, including 1,468 slices for
the multiplier, 75 slices for the squarer, 1,206 slices for the
base conversion, 117 slices for Hamming weight calculation.
One Pollard rho iteration takes 71 cycles; 35 cycles are
used for multiplication. The design achieves a maximum clock
frequency of 101 MHz, and one iteration takes 704 ns. The 𝑚-
squaring is performed with 𝑚 successive squarings. Obviously,
this architecture is not efficient. The 𝑚-squaring operations
can be largely sped up when normal basis is used.
B. Architecture II: Type-II Normal Basis Multiplier
Archi-II uses a digit-serial normal basis multiplier. When 𝑚
is small, a full systolic architecture can be used, performing
one multiplication per cycle. However, a systolic array for
F2131 is too large (more than 20,000 slices on Spartan-3). Thus,
a digit-serial architecture is used. Implementation results show
that 𝑑 = 13 gives the lowest area-delay product. The multiplier
alone uses 2,093 slices.
The basis-conversion component in Archi-I is no longer
needed in Archi-II, saving 1,468 slices. In total, the design uses
2,578 slices. On this platform, one Pollard rho iteration takes
81 cycles, including 55 cycles used for multiplication. Com-
pared to Archi-I, the 𝑚-squaring operation is largely improved.
However, the multiplier becomes much slower than that in
Archi-I. The design achieves a maximum clock frequency of
125 MHz, and one iteration takes 648 ns.
Fig. 4: Archi-II: ECC processor using normal basis
C. Architecture III: Fully Pipelined Iteration Function
Archi-III unrolls the Pollard rho iteration such that a
throughput of one iteration per cycle is achieved. Remember
that 5 multiplications are required for each iteration, as a result,
five normal basis multipliers are used. The design is fully
pipelined. Since additions and squarings are embedded in the
pipeline, it increases the delay of one iteration but does not
affect the throughput.
Fig. 5: Archi-III: pipelined processor using Shokrollahi mul-
tipliers
At the first glance, fully expanding the iteration function
seems impossible due to the inversion in each iteration. Indeed,
after 𝑑𝑥 is generated in Fig.1, inverting 𝑑𝑥 will take too much
area to fit in our target FPGA. The solution is to start the
pipeline after the real inversion (𝑢← 𝑑−1𝑛 ) is performed.
Fig 5 shows the architecture that supports the expanded
iteration function. In total, five multipliers are used. Before
starting the pipeline, 𝑥,𝑦,𝑑𝑥 and 𝑑𝑦 of 𝑃𝑖 are stored in RAM
(𝑥), (𝑦), (𝑑𝑥) and (𝑑𝑦), respectively. RAM (𝑑𝑛) keeps the
intermediate data 𝑑𝑖 of Alg. 2, and 𝑢 is ready in register 𝑅𝑢.
After starting the pipeline, the five multipliers perform the
following operations.
∙ Mul 1: 𝑡𝑖 ← 𝑢𝑑𝑖−1
∙ Mul 2: 𝑢← 𝑢𝛼𝑖
∙ Mul 3: 𝜆← 𝑑𝑦(1/𝑑𝑥)
∙ Mul 4: 𝜆(𝑥′ + 𝑥)
∙ Mul 5: 𝑑′𝑛 ← 𝑑′𝑛𝑑𝑥′
Mul 1, Mul 2 and Mul 5 are used by batch inversion (Alg.
2), while Mul 3 and Mul 4 are used for point addition (Fig.
1).
The inversion (𝑢← 𝑑−1𝑛 ) is performed by another multiplier
together with a squarer. In order to maximize engine utiliza-
tion, we interleave two groups of iteration function. When
the engine is executing one group, the inverter is performing
inversion for the other group.
The implementation of Archi-III consumes 22,195 slices
and 20 block RAMs (RAMB16s) on the Xilinx Spartan-3
XC3S5000 FPGA. One fully pipelined Shokrollahi’s multiplier
uses 4,391 slices. The inverter itself uses 4,761 slices. In total,
the design uses 26,731 slices. The post placing-and-routing
results show that this design can achieve a maximum clock
frequency of 111 MHz.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
TABLE I: Cost for the iteration function using various archi-
tectures
Area Freq. Delay Throughput
#slice /#BRAM [MHz] [Cycles] per FPGA
Archi-I: 3,656 / 4 101 71 12.8 ×106
Polynomial basis
Archi-II: 2,578 / 4 125 81 18.5 ×106
Type-II ONB
Archi-III: 26,731 / 20 111 23 ∗ 111 ×106
Shokrollahi’s
* Note that Archi-III has 23 stages in the pipeline, thus has a delay of 23
cycles. But the averge throughput is one iteration per cycle.
The ECC2K-130 attack using FPGAs is conducted using
an improved version of the COPACOBANA cluster described
in [10], [12], also known as RIVYERA [22]. It is popu-
lated with 128 Spartan-3 XC3S5000 FPGAs and an optional
32MB memory per FPGA combined in one 19” housing. All
FPGAs are connected with two opposite directed, systolic
ring networks that directly interface with the PC (which is
integrated in the same housing) via two individual PCI Express
communication controllers. Although this setup can obviously
provide a significant amount of bandwidth due to its local
communication paths, the ECC2K-130 attack design actually
requires only moderate communication performance.
Table I summarizes the implementation results on a Spartan-
3 XC3S5000 FPGA. Based on the available resources (33,280
slices and 104 BRAMs) of each XC3S5000 FPGA, we also
estimated that at most 9 clones of Archi-I or 12 clones of
Archi-II can be implemented on a single FPGA. For Archi-III,
one clone uses 80% of the available resources of one FPGA.
The throughput per engine, 𝑇𝑒 is computed as 𝑇𝑒 =
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞.
𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 , and the throughput per FPGA 𝑇𝑐 is computed
as 𝑇𝑐 = 𝑇𝑒 ∗ 𝑙. Here, 𝑙 is the number of engines on a single
FPGA. Compared with Archi-I, Archi-II has smaller area and
shorter delay. In other words, Type-II optimal normal basis
has significant advantages for this application. On the other
hand, Archi-III achieves a 8.6 times speedup over Archi-II. The
improvement mainly comes from the efficient field arithmetic
and the special architecture. The use of Shokrollahi’s algorithm
significantly improved the throughput of a multiplier, while
the expansion of the iteration function hides delays caused by
addition and squaring in the pipeline.
In Table II we compare our results with similar implemen-
tations on different platforms.
To our knowledge, this is the first FPGA implementation
using fast normal-basis multiplication to attack ECDLP. As
a point of comparison, we look into the work of Meurice de
TABLE II: Performance comparison
Source Platform Challenge Frq. Throughput
[MHz] [×106]
[17] Xilinx FPGA ECC2-131 100 10.0
S3E1200-4
[1] Cell CPU ECC2K-130 3,200 27.7
6 SPEs, 1 PPE
[1] Graphics Card ECC2K-130 1,242 54.0
GTX 295
[1] Core 2 Extreme ECC2K-130 3,000 22.5
Q6850, 4 cores
This work Xilinx FPGA ECC2K-130 111 111
(Archi-III) XC3S5000
Dormale, et al. [17]. They do not specifically target Koblitz
curves and they are using different FPGAs, which makes a
fair comparison difficult.
On the other hand, there is an interesting comparison
between implementations of the same attack (and thus iteration
function) on different platforms other than FPGAs. As part of
the global distributed effort to attack ECC2K-130 [1], efforts
have been made to speed-up the iteration function on CPUs,
GPUs and PlayStation 3. These platforms are state-of-the-art
processors supporting massive parallelism. Compared to these
platforms, our FPGA implementation is at least 2 times faster
in terms of throughput.
The whole complexity of this attack is around 260.9 it-
erations. Populated with 128 FPGA each, a single COPA-
COBANA finishes 258.7 = 128⋅(111⋅220 ⋅3600⋅24⋅365) itera-
tions in one year. We estimate that given five COPACOBANA
clusters, the ECC2K-130 challenge can be solved in one year.
VII. CONCLUSION
A new efficiency record for FPGAs in cracking public-key
cryptosystems based on elliptic curves is reported. We conduct
a detailed comparison of different architectures for normal-
basis multipliers suited this application. The comparison in-
cludes the first FPGA implementation using normal basis. Our
results show that even low-cost FPGAs outperform CPUs, the
PlayStation 3 platform and even GPUs.
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